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Abstract 
Divergence is a fact of social life; people select different tastes to 
distinguish themselves from others and they abandon tastes when others adopt 
them.  But while we know a great deal about conformity, it predicts convergence, 
and thus is less equipped to explain why people diverge.  We suggest people 
diverge to maintain clear signals of identity.  Our approach emphasizes that the 
meaning of signals is set at a social rather than individual level. Tastes gain signal 
value through association with groups or types of individuals, but become diluted 
when members of more than one type hold them.  Thus different types of people 
will diverge in the tastes they select, and they will abandon tastes they previously 
liked when they are adopted by members of other social types. (127 words) 
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The young always have the same problem- how to rebel and conform at the same time. 
They solve this problem by defying their parents and copying one another.  
  - Quentin Crisp 
   Kids want to show they are different from their parents and the jocks want to 
separate themselves from the geeks.  Shanghai residents avoid purchasing Volkswagen 
Santanas because they “are a favorite first car among the nouveaux riches outside the big 
cities” (Wonacott, 2004, p. B1) and New Yorkers wore mesh trucker hats until the bridge 
and tunnel crowd adopted them (Barker, 2004).  Intellectuals want to show they are more 
thoughtful than the masses and the original members of any cultural scene (i.e. music, 
style, philosophical schools, etc.) want to differentiate themselves from the posers that 
come along later.  The social process that underlies all these examples is one of 
divergence.  People select tastes that distinguish them from other types of people, and 
they abandon tastes that are corrupted when the wrong types adopt them.  Divergence is 
pervasive in social life. 
 These facts are so obvious they hardly need stating save for one important 
observation: our theories in social science are generally unable to account for them.  One 
of the most widely discussed principles in social psychology is that of conformity 
(Allport, 1924; Sherif, 1936; Asch, 1955; Festinger, 1950, Graham, 1962; Willis, 1965; 
Allen, 1965; Milgram, Bickman, and Berkowitz, 1969), and indeed it has been raised to 
the status of a social law (see Social Impact Theory, Latane, 1981).  Researchers in 
sociology recognize similar tendencies under different names (e.g. mimetic isomorphism, 
DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Scott, 1995).   
While conformity and isomorphism processes obviously exist and are important, 
they cannot account for a world in which people select tastes that distinguish themselves 
from others and, more costly, abandon tastes they once held when they are adopted by the 
wrong types.  Conformity has difficulty predicting divergence.  Indeed, models of the 
diffusion of innovations and cultural practices, which are based implicitly on conformity 
dynamics (Rogers, 1983; Bass, 1969), are well equipped to explain increases in adoption, 
but as Macy and Strang (2001) note, they are “poorly equipped to account for almost 
anything else” (p. 148).  We know that people diverge but why?  
The uniqueness literature in psychology has raised the important observation that 
people experience drives to differentiate as well as to belong, but this literature is much 
smaller than the literature on conformity, and it leaves some important questions 
unanswered.  The uniqueness literature argues individuals have an internal drive to see 
themselves as different.  Individuals feel bad in situations where they are overly similar 
to others, and they repair the negative feelings by emphasizing aspects that make them 
different from others.  By focusing on the feelings and reactions of individuals, however, 
the uniqueness literature is not equipped to explain the social character of divergence--the 
uniqueness literature would allow individuals to diverge in unique, perhaps bizarre, 
directions, but our approach points out that most divergence is driven by a process that 
unfolds at the social level.   
We propose a signaling identity approach to divergence.  Rather than focusing on 
individual drives for uniqueness, we focus on how meanings are constructed and diluted 
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as collections of people interact at the social level.  Types of people diverge in an effort 
to maintain clear signals of identity.  Individuals cannot construct meaning on their own, 
they must join with other individuals of a similar type in order to create a signal that is 
imbued with meaning.  But when a taste is adopted by other types of individuals, the taste 
can lose its ability to signal identity effectively.  Our model predicts that collections of 
individuals will join together to select tastes that signal a shared identity, and they will 
collectively abandon previously held tastes when other types of individuals adopt them. 
 Before presenting our theory, we first review literature on convergence and 
divergence, and then present three key questions that are unresolved by previous 
literature: (1) Why is divergence not idiosyncratic?  Collections of people often diverge 
in the same direction at the same time, an observation that is difficult to explain within 
the traditional uniqueness literature.  (2) Where do people diverge? People care about 
divergence much more in some domains than others, about sharing the same music tastes 
than the same bike lights.  We should understand why domains vary in their use as 
signals of identity.  (3) Who drives divergence?  People seem likely to abandon tastes 
when other types of people adopt their practices.  Abandonment is a particularly rigorous 
form of divergence because it requires people to give up a taste they once favored.  We 
should understand in what situations this occurs.  The body of the paper addresses each of 
these questions in turn, providing a simple mathematical model that clarifies our 
predictions, and then reviewing evidence consistent with the model from previous work 
in psychology, sociology, economics, and consumer behavior as well as our own recent 
research. 
 
Previous Literature 
Convergence 
There are at least two important reasons to believe that people’s behavior will 
converge and cultural practices will be relatively stable.  The first, and major reason is 
conformity.  Describing early investigations of conformity (Allport, 1924; Moore, 1921), 
Turner (1991) notes this work “suggested processes of convergence in the group (i.e. 
people seemed to move towards and become more similar to each other)” (p. 9).  People 
look to others for information about how to behave (informational influence) and may 
conform to gain rewards or avoid punishment (normative influence), but regardless 
people should converge (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955).  Whether in comparing the length of 
lines (Asch, 1955, see Bond and Smith, 1996 for a review), estimating the amount of 
point of light moved in a dark room (Sherif, 1936), deciding whether to serve intestinal 
meats to one’s family (Lewin, 1947), or evaluating men’s suits (Venkatesan, 1966), 
selecting brands of bread (Stafford, 1966), people choose in ways that conform to the 
behavior of those around them, and thus their choices and opinions converge with others 
(convergence even occur nonconsciously, Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; Epley & Gilovich, 
1999).   
On the macro level, economists and sociologists have models of conformity that 
discuss how individual imitation can lead to broad scale convergence.  Bandwagon 
effects describe cases where individual demand for something is increased due to the fact 
that others are consuming it (Granovetter & Soong, 1986; Iannaccone, 1989; Liebenstein, 
1950, 1976; Veblen, 1899 [1912]).  Actors may also attend more to others behavior when 
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situations are uncertain, leading to herding behavior or information cascades (Banerjee, 
1992; Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, & Welch, 1992; Strang & Macy, 2001). 
A second principle that predicts convergence deals less directly with social 
motives but can be applied to this area.  Research on “mere exposure” has documented 
that people prefer things they have seen more often (Zajonc, 1968; see also Borenstein, 
1989; Frumkin, 1963; Kuntz-Wilson & Zajonc, 1980; Mita, Dermer, & Knight, 1977; 
Moreland and Beach, 1992).  People should see popular things more frequently, and thus 
may come to prefer what others already like, leading to convergence. 
Overall, research suggests that people do what others do and like what others like 
and together these principles suggest that cultural practices should converge over time.  
While seemingly uncontroversial, these principles, without amendment, suggest some 
implausible implications: we should dress identically with others, say the same phrases, 
and prefer the same music.  But the fact that these predictions are so wildly implausible 
suggests that we need to understand additional factors that produce divergence.   
 
Divergence 
Convergence principles have been widely documented, but some researchers have 
also considered principles that may lead people to diverge. However, as we discuss 
below, their theories still leave important questions unresolved. 
  
Divergence driven by a desire for uniqueness 
Social scientists have argued that individuals want to be different: “the distinction 
seeking actor is at continual pains to seek out such things that are currently difficult to 
come by and to reject and avoid those which are becoming commonplace,” (Robinson, 
1961, p. 384-385).  Early on, economic theorizing discussed the drive for difference, 
suggesting people choose things that set them apart from the masses (Veblen, 1899 
[1912]).  Liebenstein (1950) argued people “search for exclusiveness…through the 
purchase of distinctive clothing, foods, automobiles, houses, or anything else that 
individuals may believe will in some way set them off from the mass of mankind” 
(p.184), and discussed “snob effects” or cases where individual demand is decreased 
because others are consuming (also see Liebenstein, 1976; Granovetter & Soong, 1986). 
Psychologists have also made a concerted effort to study the drive for uniqueness 
(Fromkin, 1970; Snyder & Fromkin, 1980).  They suggest people are “motivated to seek 
some sense of difference relative to others” and “when a person feels a very high degree 
of similarity relative to another, a negative emotional reaction should occur” (Snyder & 
Fromkin, 1984, p. 34) driving the person to take steps to decrease perceived similarity.  
When people feel similar to others, they focus on differences between themselves and 
others who seem similar (Ganster, McCuddy, and Fromkin, 1977), misremember actual 
levels of similarity (Byrne and Griffitt, 1969; Smith, 1975; Snyder & Batson, 1974), 
provide lower similarity ratings (Fromkin, Brandt, Dipboye, & Pyle, 1974;), sit further 
away from those who seem similar (Snyder & Endelman, 1979), generate more unique 
uses for ordinary objects (Fromkin, 1968), and place higher value on scarce future 
options (Fromkin, 1970). 
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Note that the uniqueness literature has focused on processes that might be hard to 
observe by outsiders—true, people sit further away and work harder at being creative, but 
focusing on differences and placing value on scarce options are internal, unobservable 
processes.  In one of the few studies that have investigated how people choose when 
confronted with similarity, Ariely and Levav (2000) find that sequential choice in a group 
setting tends to induce individuals to choose different options from others.  Whether 
ordering lunch entrees at a Chinese restaurant or beers at a local brewery, people tended 
to diverge from others’ choices (and their divergent choices actually leave them less 
satisfied).  Ariely and Levav suggest this divergence may have been caused by the self-
presentational goal of appearing unique to others. 
Literature on the pursuit of distinction, then, would predict individuals might 
diverge in their tastes to maintain a unique sense of self.   
 
A moderate amount of similarity: Resolving convergence and divergence? 
Taken together, research on convergence and divergence presents an interesting 
puzzle.  While the conformity literature predicts people will choose the same thing as 
others, the uniqueness literature suggests people will diverge.  If uniqueness is a strong 
drive, why have previous studies so easily found conformity?  Furthermore, if people 
experience opposing pressures towards convergence and divergence, then how do they 
resolve the conflict?   
Not surprisingly, researchers have argued that they do so by locating somewhere 
in the middle.  The uniqueness literature suggests “a moderate level of similarity relative 
to another person results in a positive state” (Snyder & Fromkin, 1980, p. 22) and suggest 
that an extremely high or low degree of similarity to others should be extremely aversive.  
Supporting this notion, students who were told their responses on a traits, values, and 
interests test were moderately similar to 10,000 other college students reported more 
positive mood than students who were told they were either highly similar or highly 
dissimilar (Fromkin, 1972).  
The uniqueness literature (Snyder and Fromkin, 1980) argues conformity research 
found convergence because it studied a narrow range of (moderate) similarity.  Studies of 
conformity focus on cases where people are moderately similar and are making a small 
number of decisions.  They argue that increasing similarity even further should increase 
pressures to be unique.  Thus if conformity researchers had increased the amount of 
similarity faced by subjects, the uniqueness literature argues they might have found 
divergence instead. 
We suggest that moderate similarity does not fully explain the differences 
between the literatures on conformity and uniqueness.  If degree of similarity was the 
sole reason for the different findings, subjects must have felt greater similarity to their 
fellow respondents in studies that found divergence versus convergence.  But Ariely and 
Levav (2000) studied people, drawn from the population of lunch eaters, who presumably 
knew many dimensions on which they differed from their lunch partners and who dined 
mostly in groups smaller than 4.  It seems unlikely that these people felt more similar to 
each other than the 18-22 year old college students in Asch’s (1951) study, who knew 
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nothing about each other aside from their identical responses on one task, and who 
participated in a group of 8.  While the idea of moderate similarity provides some 
intuition about when to expect convergence or divergence, it does not explain all the 
differences between the two literatures. 
Moreover, though we agree that too much similarity can be aversive, we think the 
uniqueness literature defined “too much similarity” in an overly stringent fashion.  A 
typical experimental manipulation in research (e.g., Fromkin, 1968, 1972; Ganster, 
McCuddy & Fromkin, 1977) might have participants respond to dozens of attitude items 
and then give them feedback that their responses on 80% or 95% of the items were 
identical to the modal response of “10,000 other college students.”  We suspect 
divergence processes play a role in social life even in situations where we don’t feel 
identical to 10,000 of our peers.    
Literature on optimal distinctiveness (Brewer, 1991, 1993; Brewer and Pickett, 
1999; Brewer and Roccas, 2001) suggests people resolve the “fundamental tension 
between human needs for validation and similarity to others and a countervailing need for 
uniqueness and individuation” (Brewer, 1991, p. 477) by defining themselves in terms of 
distinctive category memberships.  When people feel overly similar, their renewed need 
for individuation drives them to emphasize distinctive group memberships (ex: band 
member rather than Plainsville High student); when people feel excessively different, 
they emphasize broad, generic social category memberships (e.g., Plainsville High 
student rather than chess club member) (Brewer and Pickett, 1999).  Membership in small 
groups allows people to feel similar and different at the same time: similar because they 
are part of a group and different because the group is separate from the masses.  
We like Brewer’s theoretical arguments about the competing drives for 
assimilation and distinction, but the main mechanism that has been studied by research on 
optimal distinctiveness is one that is internal.  When made to feel overly similar, people 
mentally emphasize groups they belong to that are smaller, when overly distinctive, 
people mentally emphasize groups that are larger.  The uniqueness literature stresses 
similar internal tactics by saying people can achieve uniqueness by mentally emphasizing 
ways in which they are different from others (e.g. Ganster, McCuddy, and Fromkin, 
1977) or distorting similarity information (Byrne and Griffitt, 1969; Fromkin, Brandt, 
Dipboye, & Pyle, 1974; Smith, 1975; Snyder & Batson, 1974).  Internal processes, 
however, seem too flexible to account for the costly behaviors we observe when people 
diverge from others in the social environment.  Why get a body piercing when you can 
mentally emphasize your membership in club culture?  Why blow big bucks on a Prada 
handbag when you can mentally tally the value of your stock portfolio?  
Another limitation of previous research on divergence is that it has focused on 
states that seem highly transient.  The uniqueness literature argues divergence will occur 
when “a person feels a very high degree of similarity relative to another,” (Snyder & 
Fromkin, p. 34).  Optimal distinctiveness suggests that individuals will choose to 
emphasize more divergent identities when they feel depersonalized.   
Transient states cannot explain why tastes die or only come back in style after 
long periods.  Sure, people might abandon tastes if they are in a state in which they feel 
overly similar or depersonalized, but why would these individuals not re-adopt those 
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tastes once the transient state passed?  A leisure suit fan might stop wearing a leisure suit 
after visiting a club filled with leisure-suited men, but put it on again after a particularly 
isolated day at work.  An English professor might stop talking about Derrida at a party 
where everyone else is doing so, but take it up again at the next one.  We commonly think 
of fads as transient, but their transientness takes place on a time scales -- weeks, months, 
or years-- that are mismatched to the momentary processes that have been studied in the 
lab.   
Questions Raised by Moderate Similarity/ Optimal Distinctiveness  
While postulating a preference for moderate similarity or optimal distinctiveness 
helps us understand why we don’t see total convergence or divergence in cultural 
practices, such approaches raise some important questions that have not been resolved. 
 
Question 1: Why isn’t divergence idiosyncratic? 
Perhaps the most important limitation of previous theories is that they have 
primarily focused on individual level analysis.  The uniqueness literature argues 
divergence will occur when “a person feels a very high degree of similarity relative to 
another,” (Snyder & Fromkin, 1980, p. 34).  Optimal distinctiveness also focuses on the 
individual, suggesting “individuals will…define themselves in terms of social identities 
that are optimally distinctive,” (Brewer & Pickett, 2004, p. 258).  Because these theories 
have focused on individual divergence, they have difficulty explaining why group A 
diverges from group B, or why everyone in a group diverges in a similar direction, often 
at the same time. 
We note here that there is another, quite different, class of theories that would 
predict idiosyncratic divergence.  Many of the taste domains we will discuss in this paper 
may be affected by internal drives for novelty and variety (Acker and McReynolds, 1967; 
Cattell, 1975; Farley and Farley, 1967).  Novelty or variety-seeking would suggest people 
diverge when they get bored with tastes, but this individual focus means these 
perspectives have the same difficulty addressing the points raised above. 
 
Question 2: Where do people diverge?   
The notion of moderate similarity also doesn’t specify where people should 
diverge.  Momentary thought suggests there are certain domains where people are much 
less willing to accept similarity.  People get more upset when they wear the same dress to 
a party than when they bring the same toothbrush to a camping trip.  Why? 
In answering this question, we would benefit from understanding situational 
factors that prompt convergence and divergence, but unfortunately the uniqueness 
literature has little to say about how choice domain induces more or less divergence.  
Though Snyder and Fromkin (1980) theorized that certain objects may be valued as 
uniqueness attributes (e.g. scarce products), consistent with the focus on the individual 
noted above, their original work (Snyder and Fromkin, 1977) as well as most subsequent 
research has focused primarily on personality and individual differences in the need for 
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uniqueness (Tepper, 1994; Lyne and Harris, 1997; Tian, Bearden, and Hunter, 2001).  
Consequently, we know a good deal about how certain individuals may select more 
unique products, but very little about how the situation itself, or the domain in which the 
choice is made, influences the degree of divergence preferred. Moreover, the individual 
approach would predict individuals will either be highly likely to abandon tastes or 
highly likely to stick with them, without recognizing that people strive to be unique in 
some domains more than others (music versus bike lights).1 
 
Question 3: Who drives divergence?  
The prediction that people strive for moderate similarity overemphasizes the 
underlying driving force of similarity--it predicts people should be most likely to diverge 
when they feel extremely similar.  Because an individual is likely to be highly similar to 
their friends, the prediction is that individuals should be less likely to dress like their 
friends than members of another social group.  Punks should be more likely to diverge 
from other punks than from mainstream culture.  On a macro level, people in LA 
shouldn’t worry much that their cultural practices are being adopted by people in Des 
Moines (who differ on many dimensions and thus are only moderately similar), they 
should worry most about other LA residents.  We suggest these predictions are false. 
 
Summary: Three Questions  
Taken together, previous work has provided some insight into why people may 
diverge, but cannot explain many cases of divergence and leaves some important 
questions unanswered.  We argue that previous approaches are overly self-focused.  
People care about maintaining a unique self-concept, but also about how their identities 
are received by others.  We agree with the previous literature’s suggestion that 
divergence is driven by the desire to express an identity that is somewhat unique, but 
rather than being driven by individual feelings of extreme similarity, we propose a theory 
of signaling identity in which divergence is driven by the desire to maintain clear signals 
of identity.  
 
Why Isn’t Divergence Idiosyncratic?  Signaling Identity  
“Our consumption habits are now a form of social currency.  The man who uses Callaway golf 
clubs, drives a Jaguar, and wears Ralph Lauren apparel…is a man separate and apart from the man 
who uses a Penn fishing reel, drives a Dodge Durango, and wears Levi’s.” (Vincent, 2002, p. 11) 
 
                                                 
1 The problem with focusing on individual differences here is the same as that facing typical personality 
research: concerns about lack of cross-situational consistency (Ross & Nisbett, 1991).  This approach 
would predict that the same individuals pilot new hairstyles, political views, and home decorations.   
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 “Although social signaling via the display of one’s attitudes and preferences is presumably a 
ubiquitous social communication process, only limited research in psychology has investigated its 
characteristics” (Shavitt and Nelson, 1999, p. 38). 
 
 In an attempt to address the questions raised in the previous section we propose a 
signaling identity approach to taste divergence.  Importantly, our approach assumes that 
individuals must coordinate their identity signals with others.  Individuals cannot diverge 
on their own, they must be sensitive to how meaning is constructed and destroyed as 
collections of people interact at a social level.   
Our identity-signaling approach assumes that people diverge as part of their effort 
to maintain signal fidelity.  Tastes gain signaling value through their association with 
groups or types of individuals, but these signals are only valuable to the degree that they 
actually provide information. If different types of people send an identical signal, it will 
have no value in distinguishing between types.  Therefore, to maintain the signaling value 
of their tastes, different types will diverge in the tastes they select and they will abandon 
tastes when their meaning becomes diluted.  Our model assumes that both conformity and 
uniqueness processes are important, but the focus of the model is collective rather than 
purely individual.  Individuals converge with similar others to imbue signals with 
meaning, and they diverge from others when their signals are adopted by the wrong types 
of people.  Signals are constructed at a collective, social level, and are diluted through a 
collective, social process.  
 
Introducing a Model of Identity Signaling 
We propose a simple model that can account for much of the observed 
divergence.  The purpose of the model is to clarify thinking about the observed behavior, 
rigorously articulate our assumptions, and lay bare how our proposed mechanism works. 
Though the mathematics describing the model has been fully derived, we limit the 
mathematical details to the appendix. The major concepts of the model can be readily 
understood without them. 
To illustrate the ideas of the model, we will construct it in three stages. In Model 
1, we show how signals can be used by types to improve social interactions. Model 2 
considers how signaling differs across domains and identifies where signaling is likely to 
occur. Finally, Model 3 adds a group of identity poachers to the model in a dynamic 
setting and shows how signal dilution can lead individuals to diverge from tastes and 
behaviors they previously held. 
 
Tastes as Signals of identity 
 External signals are often used as information when internal attributes are not 
readily observable.  When first meeting a group of people, for instance, we may want to 
know “who would I enjoy talking to,” or “which of these people might I want to get to 
know better?”  Such answers are rarely immediately obvious and we often use signals to 
determine which people we want to interact with further.  Such signals may include the 
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person’s tastes, the clothes they wear, the attitudes they profess, or the phrases they use.  
As Belk, Bahn, and Mayer (1982) note, “one of the strongest and most culturally 
universal phenomena … is the tendency to make inferences about others based on their 
choice of consumption objects” (p.4).  Signals can be extremely easy to detect, like 
whether someone has a pierced nose, or more difficult, like whether they pronounce a 
slang term with the correct intonation.   
Previous literature has noted that tastes can have symbolic value (Abelson & 
Prentice, 1986; Herek, 1986; Levy, 1959; Park, Jaworski, & MacInnis, 1986; Prentice, 
1987; Shavitt, 1990; Solomon, 1983; Zaltman & Wallendorf, 1979), but has given less 
attention to how tastes actually gain this symbolic meaning.  Research suggests people 
express their identity through their attitudes and possessions (Belk, 1988; Levy, 1959; 
Wicklund & Gollwitzer, 1982; see Sirgy, 1982 for an early review; Holman, 1981; 
Abelson & Prentice, 1986; Escalas & Bettman, 2003; Kleine, Kleine, & Kerman, 1993; 
Ball & Tasaki, 1992; Rubinstein, 1995) and other work suggests that tastes act as part of 
the social communication system, communicating aspects of the self to others (e.g., 
Douglas & Isherwood, 1978; Holman, 1981; McCracken, 1986; Richins, 1994a; Richins, 
1994b; Solomon, 1983; Schlenker, 1980).  But for individuals to be able to communicate 
or signal identity through tastes, others must be able to decipher or understand those 
signals.   
We now turn to a discussion of how signals gain their meaning. 
 
Meaning Construction: Signals are socially constructed 
Signals are valuable to the degree that they provide information, but meaning 
cannot be generated as an individual exercise, individuals cannot construct signals on 
their own. 
Coordination Hypothesis: tastes gain meaning as signals in a social process as 
they are expressed by similar types of individuals 
We use the term “types” rather than groups, because tastes often span traditional 
demographic groups yet still carry meaning.  People who wear their baseball caps 
backwards or who talk about Foucault may come from different races, ages, and cultures, 
but as long as they are similar in some way (e.g. they all listen to the same music, or have 
the same disdain for reifying power relationships) then the taste has meaning.  Thus type 
refers to some degree of similarity between individuals expressing the taste. 
Signals cannot be constructed solely by individuals because an idiosyncratic 
expressive display could not be understood by others. Consider the inference problem 
faced by others when an individual sets out to convey a distinctive identity by choosing 
an entirely unique combination of markers (e.g. wearing a pith helmet and a football 
jersey), no one will know what that combination stands for and it will have no expressive 
value.  Thus, a person’s decision to adopt or abandon a taste is not just a personal choice 
made to convey a self-image, it must effectively signal identity to the broader social 
world.   
More effective signals can be constructed when individuals join with similar 
others, conjointly displaying the same signal.  If a group of lacrosse fans or mushroom 
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hunters all adopt the pith helmet and football jersey combination, people may start to 
recognize it as a signal of identity as opposed to simply being bizarre.   
 
Model 1: Signaling Identity 
Imagine a community where actors differ in their preferences, i.e. their interests 
and tastes. For the purposes of simplicity, let there be two types of actors (Type A and 
Type B). All actors of the same Type Are identical in their preferences. Actors play a 
game with two stages. In the first stage, each actor chooses a signal. Although we will 
use the language of choice, we are not arguing that types have agency; instead we are 
assuming that certain “picks” are more likely to be stable in an evolutionary process of 
variation and selection.  Every actor can signal by investing in some choice of activity 
within a fixed domain. For example, in the domain of clothing, an actor can select the 
color or style of his jacket. In the domain of musical taste, an actor could develop 
knowledge of independent bands or opera.   
In the second stage of the model, the actor randomly meets another actor that she 
has never met before. She does not observe the other actor’s type directly, but observes 
the taste the other has signaled. Signals are such that they can observed relatively quickly 
(e.g., during a brief conversation) before significant interaction has occurred. 
The receiver observes the sender’s choice of signal and then decides how she 
wants to treat the sender in their interaction.  Suppose the receiver would prefer to choose 
action α if the sender is of Type A and action β if the sender is of Type B. If A and B are 
two sub-cultures who want nothing to do with each other, then for an actor of Type A, α 
would be “pursue interaction” while β would be “avoid interaction,” and the reverse 
actions would be chosen by an actor of Type B.  Alternatively, suppose A is an outcast 
Type And B is an elite. If the outcast type is happy to interact with both As and B’s, but 
the mainstream only wants to interact with other B’s, then for Type A’s both α and β 
would be “pursue interaction” while for Type B’s, α would be “avoid interaction” and β 
would be “pursue interaction.”  
We define the function bx(y, z) to be the benefit an individual of type x receives 
when an individual of type y chooses action  z.  As a base case, let us assume that 
individuals want to be treated as they see themselves. 
 
bA(A, α) > bA(A, β) and bA(B, α) > bA(B, β) 
 
In words, As prefer to be treated as As rather than as B’s no matter whether they are 
interacting with As or B’s, and similarly for B’s: 
 
bB(A, β) > bB(A, α) and bB(B, β) > bB(B, α) 
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Understanding the Model 
In this simple model, there are no conflicting interests; everyone wants to treat 
senders exactly how the senders wish to be treated. Therefore, the two types have an 
incentive to coordinate on different signals so that members of each type can uniquely 
signal their identity. Type A actors should coordinate on one signal, i, and all Type B 
actors should coordinate on some other signal j.  Signals are important to this model 
because they facilitate interaction. If people could not signal, there would be no way to 
identify desired interaction partners or determine roles in interaction.  People would have 
to suffer through more unsatisfactory interactions.   
More importantly, the signaling is a social act in two ways (1) it is coordinated 
among members of the same type who choose the same signal, but also (2) members 
across types must choose different signals.  This coordination improves interactions both 
with people of the same Type And with people of other Types.  
Experimental results support the coordination hypothesis (Berger & Heath, 2005).  
Stanford undergraduates were given information about one or four users of a given brand 
(e.g. age, hobbies, etc.) and asked to infer brand personality (e.g. to what degree various 
personality traits, rugged, sincere, etc. describe the brand, see Aaker, 1997).  Half were 
given information about one brand user (a 25 year-old recent graduate who likes surfing, 
etc.) and the other half was also given information about three additional users (all 
around the same age, with similar hobbies, e.g. they all like some extreme sport).  We 
suggest individual expression cannot be received with a high degree of fidelity.  Indeed, 
though there was a high degree of meaning congruence across participants in the similar 
type condition (α = .94), there was significantly lower congruence across participants in 
the one-person condition (α = .64).  These results support our proposition that tastes gain 
meaning through expression by similar types of individuals, not by idiosyncratic 
individuals acting on their own.  
Seeing expression as socially coordinated differs heavily from the traditional 
perspective on self-expression which has put the emphasis on the self who is doing the 
expressing.  Traditionally the literature has argued that individuals use possessions, 
attitudes, and beliefs to pursue unique self-image (Fromkin, 1978; Gross & Osterman, 
1971; Liebenstein, 1950), “maintain self-concept” (e.g. Ball and Tasaki, 1992, p. 155; 
Sirgy, 1982) and “express self-identities” (e.g. Prentice, 1987, p. 993) and personal 
values (e.g. Herek, 1986; Katz, 1960).  Escalas and Bettman (2003), for instance, argue 
individuals “engage in consumption behavior to construct their self-concept and create 
their personal identity” (p. 339) and Miller, McIntyre, and Mantrala (1993) suggest that 
the “the fashion process is a dynamic example of the use of products to express self-
image,” (p. 142, emphasis added).  Similarly, the functional approach to attitudes (Katz, 
1960, 1968; Smith, 1947, Smith, Bruner, and White, 1956; Herek, 1986) focuses on 
psychological benefits individuals derive from expressing “attitudes appropriate to his 
personal values and to his concept of himself,” (Katz, 1960, p. 170).   
While some researchers do acknowledge the social and symbolic function of 
attitudes (e.g. Abelson & Prentice, 1986; Shavitt, 1990), as Shavitt and Nelson (1999) 
note, “this social identity function of attitudes…has primarily been investigated from the 
perspective of the attitude holder,” (p.38).  Speaking more broadly about social 
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psychology as a whole, Brewer (1991) notes that “ in recent years, social psychologists 
has become increasingly ‘self’-centered,” (p. 475) and that  “until recently, social 
psychological theories of the self focused on the individuated self-concept- a person’s 
sense of unique identity differentiated from others,” (Brewer and Pickett, 1999, p. 71).  In 
this literature, individuals maintain self-esteem by expressing the individual identity they 
themselves wish to create. 
In our view, previous literature has erred in emphasizing the self part of self-
expression.  By focusing on individuals, the literature has neglected the fact that 
individuals can’t express meanings that are not socially understood.  Adolescent boys can 
purchase muscle cars to bolster their masculine self-concept, but they cannot define the 
meaning of that symbol (in fact, that symbol may lose meaning over time when muscle 
cars are purchased by kids who can barely shave).  Individuals also cannot control shifts 
in the meaning of the signals they send.  People can buy SUVs because they want to be 
seen as outdoorsy, but if society comes to see SUVs as silly gas-guzzlers, the wanna-be 
outdoorsmen are out of luck.  Finally, by concentrating on how individuals construct 
identities, the previous literature has neglected the broader question of how tastes get 
their meaning in the first place.  To be fair, previous research has not entirely ignored the 
fact that tastes have symbolic meaning, it has just not systematically discussed how 
meaning is acquired.  
We emphasize the social nature of identities and attempt to understand how tastes 
acquire their social meaning as signals of social identity.  Individuals can select from 
existing meanings, but the nature of these meanings are determined by social interaction 
rather than individual action.   
 Our approach finds theoretical support from a diverse set of literatures.  Work on 
social identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) also takes identity as derived from outside the 
individual, suggesting that aspects of an individual’s self image are derived from the 
groups to which he/she belongs.  However, this literature focuses primarily on how 
individuals use social identities to manage self-esteem, and on how individuals react 
when they adopt a particular identity (e.g., by venerating the ingroup and favoring it in 
resource allocations).  The theoretical approach of symbolic interactionism (Blumer, 
1969; Mead, 1934; Solomon, 1983) also notes the social nature of the self and recognizes 
symbols acquire shared meaning through socialization, but does not make it clear how 
this occurs.  We share the notion with these theories that identities are not individually 
assembled, but our model tries to make explicit how meaning is constructed. 
The notion that cultural tastes demarcate social groups is familiar to sociologists 
(Bourdieu, 1979; DiMaggio, 1987; Douglas & Isherwood, 1978; Simmel, 1904; 
Goffman, 1951), but they often take these markers as given.  Simmel (1904 [1957]), for 
instance, argued that fashion “differentiates…one social stratum form another” (p. 541).  
Goffman (1951) discussed how status symbols designate class and “visibly divide the 
world into categories of persons” (p. 294).  As Douglas and Isherwood (1978) note 
though, tastes themselves “are neutral” (p. 12) and we argue that it is only through 
expression by multiple individuals of the same type that tastes are imbued with meaning. 
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Summary: Why Isn’t Divergence Idiosyncratic? 
To summarize, our model suggests that tastes facilitate interaction and acquire 
shared meaning through association with individuals of a certain type. 
Seeing tastes as signals of (type) identity immediately addresses one of the issues 
with moderately similarity, namely why divergence isn’t idiosyncratic.  Idiosyncratic 
divergence will not be understood, and thus individuals will always choose to diverge 
along with other members of their type.  Rather than idiosyncratically selecting and 
abandoning tastes, people converge with similar others, and so communicate an 
understandable social identity.   
We now move to examine how our signaling approach can resolve another 
question neglected by previous approaches, where does divergence occur? 
  
Where Do People Diverge?  The Question of Domains 
Simple observation shows that there is more divergence in the clothes people 
wear and the cars they drive than in the notebooks they write in or bike lights they use.  
Similarly, people care a lot more when their music tastes are co-opted by the mainstream 
than when everyone else seems to use a similar type of umbrella.  What predicts the 
domains where people are more likely to diverge? 
 
The Signaling Approach to Taste Domains 
Little research has examined why divergence might be greater in some domains 
than others, but there are a few literatures that are relevant to this question. 
In the literature on conformity, Kaplan and Miller (1987) found the source of 
conformity pressure depended on the type of issue (intellective vs. judgmental) being 
discussed.  Intellective issues elicited more informational influence and judgmental issues 
elicited more normative influence.  Unfortunately, however, they never considered the 
possibility of divergence, only forces that might lead people to conform.  
Divergence may increase in domains that are public rather than private.  Ratner 
and Kahn (2002) suggest self-presentational concerns lead people to choose more variety 
in public settings than private ones.  Bearden and Etzel (1982) examined how reference 
groups influenced the choices that people made for products that were public or private 
and luxuries or necessities (e.g., golf clubs are a public luxury, mattress a private 
necessity).  But the two factors they studied didn’t capture much of the variance in 
reference group influence, even between two public necessity goods (watch and suit).  
Also, they did not suggest whether reference group influence would lead to convergence 
or divergence.   
Divergence may also increase in domains that are personally important.  
Campbell (1986), found that people were more likely to make judgments that protected 
their self-concept (e.g. underestimating the number of other who share our abilities) in 
personally important areas. Similarly, Kernis’ (1984) found need for uniqueness 
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influenced false-consensus bias on various trait estimates, but only for people who listed 
a particular trait as highly important to their self-schemas.  This work suggests people 
want to be more unique in areas they find personally important; a coin collector should 
care a lot about having unique coins.   
These approaches, however, cannot explain many cases of divergence.  Public 
domains may increase the drive for divergence, but people often seek divergence on 
practices (e.g., music tastes or home furnishings) that are not particularly public.  
Similarly, personal importance cannot explain every case of divergence because across 
individuals, certain domains (e.g. music tastes or clothing) seem to elicit more 
divergence.  
We suggest people should feel the most pressure to distinguish themselves in 
domains that define their identities and note that the identity issue plays out on two 
levels--personal and social.  At an idiosyncratic personal level, if people want to protect 
their self-concepts, then people who are self-schematic about a particular dimension 
should try harder to diverge from others on practices relevant to that dimension.  A coin-
collector and bottle-cap collector both probably seek to be unique in their own particular 
hobby domains.  But at a broader social level, individuals cannot idiosyncratically select 
domains to express their identity if they want others to receive their signal.  Signaling 
domains must be coordinated socially, and domains people use to express identity should 
overlap strongly with the domains that others use to infer identity  
 
Domain Agreement Hypothesis: The expression of identity is only valuable if it 
can be received, consequently there should be high degree of agreement about 
identity domains across individuals. 
 
Domain Overlap Hypothesis: Because of the coordination required for signals to 
be understood, people should choose to self-express in domains others use to infer 
identity.   
 
Berger & Heath (2005) found experimental support for both hypotheses in a broad 
Internet sample from across the United States (mean age = 38, 82% Caucasian).   
Separate sets of raters were given a variety of taste domains (e.g. hairstyle, toothpaste, 
jacket, etc.) and asked to rate each on either self-expression (i.e. how much choice in that 
domain contributes to self expression) or identity inference (i.e. how much choice in that 
domain is used to make inferences about others).  Supporting the Agreement hypothesis, 
there was extremely high agreement across raters about which domains were used in self-
expression / inference-making (both Cronbach α’s > .97) and supporting the Overlap 
hypothesis a high correlation was found between self-expression and inference making (r 
= .97).  In general, respondents suggested people were more likely to infer identity in 
domains like hairstyle or musical tastes as opposed to backpack or stereo brand.  These 
results support the proposition that self-expression is not an idiosyncratic activity; there is 
coordination on what domains people use to infer things about others and people express 
themselves in these domains. 
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Furthermore, if certain domains are used to infer identity the coin and bottle-cap 
collectors must be wary of the signals they send in these domains and will diverge 
beyond the hobby domains they find personally important.  Divergence is driven by the 
need to maintain clear signals of identity, and thus divergence should be greater in 
identity domains.   
 
Divergence Hypothesis: Divergence will be greater in domains used to infer 
identity. 
 
Applying this hypothesis to the divergent findings of convergence and divergence proves 
immediately useful.  While many conformity studies used choices likely to have a right 
answer and hence choice was not particularly self-expressive (e.g. length of a line, Asch, 
1951, movement of a point of light, Sherif, 1936, weight of items, Allport, 1924, or 
brands of bread, Stafford, 1966), many of the studies where divergence was found 
concern categories such as attitudes (Weir, 1971) or what to order for lunch (Ariely and 
Levav, 2000) that relate much more to identity.  
In our research, we again asked a broad Internet sample from across the United 
States to choose options in various preference domains (e.g. dish soap, stereos, hairstyles, 
favorite CD).  In each domain, they were told 65% of people preferred Option A, 25% 
preferred Option B, and 10% preferred Option C, and they indicated which option they 
would choose.  Supporting the Divergence hypothesis, the preference for divergence 
increased with the degree to which the domain was used to make inferences about others 
(Figure 1); respondents were more likely to select the option preferred by 10% of others 
in domains like hairstyle and favorite music artist as opposed to dish soap or toothpaste.  
People also avoided tastes held by too many others in identity domains; while only 24% 
of people chose Option A (65%) in domains used to infer identity (median split), almost 
half (46%) did so in less identity based domains.  
In another study we investigated divergence in actual choices.  Participants were 
seated in front of computers and given a packet of preference domains (e.g. movies, 
favorite city, clothing brand) each including a set of 10 options.  They were instructed to 
select their favorite three options in each domain and asked to enter their preferences in 
an excel spreadsheet to help with data entry.  The spreadsheet already included 
“selections from previous participants” but they were instructed to ignore those responses 
and just enter their data on the first free subject line.  The previous selections were 
actually manipulated so that some options in each domain had been selected more 
frequently; this allowed us to test whether participants would be more likely to diverge 
from the choices of others in identity domains.  Supporting the domain hypothesis, 
people were more likely to diverge from the popular option in identity-relevant domains; 
a median split on identity found that while participants selected the popular option 36% 
of the time in domains not used to infer identity, they did so only 24% of the time in 
identity domains.  
These results suggest that divergence is more likely in domains used to infer 
identity.  But this raises another important question.  Why are some domains used to infer 
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identity? Why are hairstyles or music (as opposed to back packs or bike lights) better 
signals of identity? 
Previous research suggests visibility or publicness may influence the degree to 
which tastes are used to make inferences about the individual.  Shavitt and Nelson (1999) 
argue that expressive/identity behaviors are likely to be public and Belk (1991) found that 
in general, products that were rated as more informative about users personalities had 
greater visibility.  Ratner and Kahn (2002) suggest people chose more variety in public 
because they expected others would make inferences about them based on their public 
choices.  But as Bearden and Etzel (1982) found, the public/private distinction does not 
capture enough of the variance.  Indeed, in our own work, publicness of the domains used 
in 65%/25%/10% study was somewhat predictive of divergence, but only marginally so. 
There are clearly some limitations to the use of visibility.  A person’s clothing is about as 
observable as their notebook, yet only one of those domains is used to infer identity. 
Furthermore, we often use less observable domains to infer identity--music tastes, for 
example, can hardly be described as easily observable.  Thus, while visibility is 
important, it is not the whole story. 
 
Functionality 
We suggest that some domains operate more effectively as signals of identity 
because they are easier to interpret as signals.  Most cultural practices have some 
functional value as well as some self-expressive or symbolic value (Abelson & Prentice, 
1986; Richins, 1994; Levy, 1959; Zaltman and Wallendorf, 1979).  Practices that have a 
functional component as well as an identity component will be harder to interpret as 
signals.  If an adult is eating a peanut butter and jelly sandwich, is that a signal of their 
conservative, perhaps nostalgic tastes, or a sign the cupboard was bare when they packed 
their lunch at 7:30 a.m.?  Did someone buy the new power-sander because its design 
appealed to their aesthetic sense or because they had something to sand?  In other cases, 
when options are functionally equivalent (e.g. a black jacket vs. a brown jacket), it is less 
likely that an individual’s choice will be attributed to function.   
Based on standard theories of psychological discounting (Kelly, 1973; Morris & 
Larrick, 1995), we predict that people will have greater difficulty identifying a practice as 
a signal when it has a higher functional component.  Thus, we predict that certain taste 
domains may be particularly suited for expressing identity because choice within those 
domains cannot as easily be attributed to function, hence in those domains, others will see 
choices as expressing identity. 
 
Afunctionality Hypothesis: Domains will operate more effectively as signals of 
identity when choice in them is less based on function.   
 
Bike lights are less likely to be fashion items than hairdos because the function of a bike 
light is more obvious.  Power tools are less self-expressive than music tastes because they 
have a clear functional interpretation.  Similarly, in cultural beliefs and practices where 
Divergence 18 
people think there is a right answer, functionality is high, so those beliefs are less likely 
to be used to infer identity.  Admiring Newton as a scientist will be less identity-revealing 
than admiring Rousseau as a philosopher.  Worshiping a particular god will be less 
identity-revealing in a monotheistic culture (where there seems to be a right answer) than 
in a polytheistic culture.   
 
Model 2: Introduction of Costs and Influence of Domain on Signal Interpretation 
In the previous model we did not differentiate among domains.  We now expand 
the model to allow different domains to provide different benefits.  This allows us to pose 
the question: if we allowed types to choose which domain to signal in—hairstyle, music 
taste, clothing—which domain would they pick?   
Formally, assume that an activity, i, provides benefits, bi and costs, ci,x, to the 
actor, x. The benefits and costs can depend both on the history of past investment of the 
individual actor, as well as the history of past investment by those he associated with. In 
the domain of fashion, the activity of wearing a biker jacket provides the benefit of 
warmth and protection but imposes the cost of the purchase of the jacket. In the domain 
of musical tastes, knowing specialized knowledge about hip-hop imposes the cost of time 
spent learning minutiae. If the domain is a certain kind of lingo, the cost is time spent 
listening to others speak the lingo. For simplicity, assume each actor can only invest in 
one signal each period.   
 
Understanding the Model 
The main insight provided by Model 2 is that signaling is more likely to occur in 
afunctional domains.  In functional domains, most people will select the option that 
provides the most benefit and consequently their choices do not provide good signals of 
their identity.  So choices on intellective tasks or choices of products such as stereos or 
notebooks will probably not provide good signals.  Some practices can also be broken 
down into aspects that might signal identity and those that don’t.  On a cold day, the act 
of wearing a coat doesn’t provide a signal because the benefits of wearing a coat are 
clear.  However, the color of coat one decides to wear provides a signal because the 
benefits of various colors are similar.  Thus, we expect signaling is more likely in 
afunctional domains. 
Consistent with the afunctionality hypothesis, Prentice (1987) distinguished 
certain types of objects (e.g. photos) that are more symbolic or self-expressive from those 
that are more instrumental (e.g. stereo).  Shavitt and Nelson (1999) found that people 
make fewer personality or individuating attributions for utilitarian (e.g. aspirin or air 
conditioners) products.   
Other work has directly examined the relationship between functionality of 
domains and how much they are used in identity inferences.  In the study of domains we 
mentioned previously, Berger & Heath (2005) had respondents rate each domain on 
functionality.  Consistent with the afunctionality hypothesis, there was a high negative 
correlation (r = -.90) between how much choices in the domain were functional and how 
much people used the domain to infer identity.   
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Our signaling logic implies that a particular cultural practice will act more 
effectively as a signal when people could easily choose other cultural practices that have 
the same functional value.  A Burberry raincoat is a fashion statement even on a rainy 
day because other raincoats could have served the same function at less expense, but it is 
more of a fashion statement on a dry, clear day.  Sunglasses are more of a fashion 
statement indoors than out.  An agricultural CO-OP cap is less of a statement when given 
free to a farmer and worn outdoors to shade his eyes than when paid for by a Hollywood 
actor who wears it indoors.  A cap is more of a fashion statement when the bill is turned 
backwards so it no longer serves its functional purpose. 
Another implication of our signaling logic is that individual tastes (e.g. fashion 
trends) can identify themselves as identity expressing by strategically violating 
functionality.  Beehive hairdos and mohawks are time-consuming to maintain, tattoos and 
body-piercing are painful, high-heeled shoes are difficult to walk on, Rolexes are unduly 
expensive, goldfish-swallowing and phone-booth stuffing are obviously pointless, baggy 
Zoot suits waste cloth.2  The afunctionality hypothesis helps us understand why Zoot 
suits are baggy, beehive hairdos high, and low-riders low.   
 
Summary: Where Do People Diverge?  
Our identity-signaling approach answers the question of where divergence takes 
place and why.  Divergence occurs in music tastes as opposed to toothbrushes because 
music tastes are seen as signals of identity, and people diverge to maintain the clarity of 
their signal.  The social coordination highlighted by our signal model ensures that 
individuals must express themselves in the same domains others use to infer identity.  
Furthermore it predicts, afunctional domains are better suited for identity inferences 
because those domains make it easier to determine meaning.  People are more likely to 
diverge in hairstyles than bike lights because others are likely to attribute our choice of 
bike lights to function rather than identity. 
The results we summarized here are difficult for prior approaches to explain.  The 
uniqueness literature argues people should diverge when they feel the most similar, but 
since people are more likely to share the same pen or bike light than they are to have the 
same shirt, the uniqueness literature would predict a pattern of divergence across domains 
that is opposite to the one we found.  Similarly, theories of novelty-seeking suggest that 
people should diverge when they are bored, but without a specific theory of why 
boredom should vary by domain, it cannot explain domain differences in divergence.   
Our approach also improves on previous domain approaches suggesting when we 
should see convergence vs. divergence.  Though Kaplan and Miller (1987) suggest there 
should be more informational (normative) influence on intellective (judgmental) choices 
and Bearden and Etzel (1982) examined how reference group influence differs across 
public vs. private and luxury vs. necessity products, our approach goes further to suggest 
which direction (convergence/divergence) others should influence behavior in different 
                                                 
2 Indeed the War Production Boards in WWII banned them because they wasted material, 
http://www.badfads.com/pages/fashion/ zootsuit.html 
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domains.  In functional choices or those more likely to have a right answer, informational 
influence should elicit convergence.  In a dot estimation task, for instance, others’ 
estimates will provide information that leads to convergence, but only if we think the 
quality of their vision is similar to ours.  Others’ type will play an even larger role in 
more judgmental or identity oriented choices.  People should converge with others of the 
same type, but diverge from different types; our friends using a catchphrase should 
prompt us to use it more, but others using it may lead us to diverge. 
So far our signaling model has been helpful in addressing some questions that 
have been unresolved by prior approaches, but the current model still faces a serious 
challenge.  If types just want to be identified by others then why do many signals end up 
being costly or subtle?  Why would people cut their hair in mohawks, get tattoos, or 
spend countless hours listening to music if they could just wear t-shirts with smiley faces 
or motorcycle jackets?  The probability of correct signal identification presumably 
increases with observability, so why would people select anything but the cheapest and 
most observable signals?    
For simplicity, our first model assumed everyone wanted to be identified as their 
own type.  But this is too simple: the middle class might want to be treated as wealthy, 
the unsophisticated as sophisticated and the tragically unhip as hip.  We now expand the 
model by adding posers who want to be treated as members of a type they don’t belong to 
and we investigate how the presence of posers influences the signals people use and the 
way people diverge.  We investigate, in particular, a particularly stringent form of 
divergence--when people will abandon practices and tastes they once held. 
 
Who Drives Divergence? Signal Poaching and Abandonment 
“It seemed only yesterday that Von Dutch trucker hats were worn by half the aggressively stylish 
people in the world.  Now they are scorned in the hipster circles that only recently flaunted them.” 
(Lindgren, 2004) 
 
So far we have discussed how signaling identity causes people to diverge in the 
tastes they select, but there is also another type of divergence, namely taste abandonment.  
Types select different tastes to maintain clear signals (e.g. teenagers listen to different 
music than their parents), but in some cases, people also abandon tastes they previously 
held.  Catchphrases die, people stop wearing certain styles of clothes, and fans abandon 
the very musical artists they once followed zealously.  Why? 
We suggest individuals may abandon tastes when they are adopted by other social 
types and thus their signaling value is lost.  Just as tastes gain meaning when they are 
associated with particular types of individuals, they can lose meaning when they are 
adopted by other types.   
 
Abandonment Hypothesis: individuals of one type will abandon previously held 
tastes when adoption by other types reduces their signaling value. 
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If Type A people ride Harley motorcycles, and Type B people (say brat pack Hollywood 
actors or suburban accountants) start riding them, then an observer who sees someone 
riding a Harley will find it more difficult to determine the person’s type, and 
consequently Type A’s may abandon the taste because its signal value has been lost.   
In many cases, abandonment is driven by posers.3  In our basic model, types 
wanted to be identified as their own Type And they coordinated on different signals, but 
in many cases there are people of one type who would prefer to be considered another 
type.  These posers may express another type’s signal in the hope of taking on some of 
the attributes of a member of that type.  Teenagers, for instance, may purchase fake Prada 
handbags in an attempt to seem rich and rich people may adopt teenage slang in an 
attempt to seem young and hip. 
 
Model 3: Identity Poaching and Abandonment 
To explore the phenomena of identity poaching and fashion abandonment, let us 
consider a sub-type, Type BA. The posers are formally members of Type B, but prefer to 
be treated as members of Type A.  Formally, they want their interaction partner to choose 
action α. However, other actors consider the posers to be members of B, and thus prefer 
to choose action β.  
 
bBA(A, β) > bBA(A, α) and  bBA(B, β) > bBA(B, α) 
 
Furthermore, to allow the possibility of dynamic change over time, consider a repeated 
version of the preceding game. Each period could be a day, a week, etc., but in each 
period all actors choose to signal and then have the chance to interact. 
 
Understanding the Model 
Over time, poaching will undermine the signal, leading to abandonment.  
Consider a domain (e.g. music tastes) where Type A has coordinated on signal i (e.g. hip-
hop knowledge), and Type B has coordinated on signal j (e.g. pop knowledge) and that 
signal costs are stable over time.  For the moment, take it as given that it is cheaper for 
Type A to signal hip-hop knowledge that it is for Type BA.  Members of Type A (Type 
B) choose hip-hop (pop) and will treat others who display knowledge of hip-hop as one 
of their own.  Members of Type BA would prefer to learn hip-hop but most will find it 
too costly and will continue with pop, however, some who do not find it too costly will 
switch to hip-hop.   
                                                 
3 In other cases, types may just happen to move into others’ space without an explicit desire to poach.  
Skateboarders may wear knit caps, but if it gets cold outside, everyone may start wearing them, not because 
they wasn’t to seem like skaters, but because it is cold out.  
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If an actor sees someone with knowledge of pop, he can be sure the other actor is 
of Type B. If an actor sees someone with knowledge of hip-hop, the other actor is likely 
Type A, but there is some small chance that the other actor is a poser, a Type BA. So 
long as this chance is small, members of the fringe will continue to interact with hip-hop 
signalers, risking the chance of meeting a poser for the greater reward of meeting one of 
their own. 
Suppose, however, MTV starts playing more hip-hop, making it cheaper for 
posers to learn about it.  Over time, more and more Type BA people will choose hip-hop, 
and the effectiveness of hip-hop as a signal will decline. Actors seeing someone signal 
hip-hop will become uncertain whether the other is a true Type A or a poser. If the 
number of posers who know hip-hop grows to sufficiently high numbers, the signaling 
will break down and lose all value. The taste will be abandoned. 
In addition to explaining why tastes are abandoned, the key insight of this model 
is that the taste that allow the most effective signaling of identity are those that impose a 
low cost for in-type members and a high cost for out-type members. Signals that 
maximize this difference in costs are most effective for signaling identity. In the example 
above, the high cost of knowing about hip-hop to posers and the low cost to authentic 
type members, kept posers out. However, if the differences in costs were to disappear 
(due to MTV or some other factor), the incoming posers dilute the value of the signal, 
and the signaling breaks down. 
 
What Prior Literature Says About Abandonment 
Sociologists agree that individuals make cultural choices to set themselves apart 
from members of other social categories (Bourdieu, [1979] 1984; Bryson, 1996; Simmel, 
1904 [1957]; DiMaggio, 1982; Gans, 1974; Levine, 1988; Veblen, 1899[1912]; 
Robinson, 1961; Dooley, 1930), but they have primarily focused on high status groups 
diverging from low status adopters (see Pesendorfer, 1995 and Bernheim, 1994 for 
economic treatments of the topic).  Bourdieu ([1979] 1984) used the term aesthetic 
distancing to describe the process where people reject tastes that are held by members of 
other groups.  He finds that when asked what series of objects would make a great photo, 
people with higher levels of education “refuse the ordinary objects of popular 
admiration” (p. 35) such as a first communion or sunset, rejecting them as trivial or 
naively human.  Bryson (1996) finds that people with higher levels of education tend to 
actively dislike the music of people with lower average levels of education (gospel, rap, 
country and heavy metal) more than other types of music.  In examining naming 
differences between blacks and whites in Mississippi in the early 1900’s, London and 
Morgan (1994) found that whites selected names that distanced themselves from the 
names used by blacks. 
Emphasizing that groups compete over identities in the broader social 
environment, provides a healthy corrective to views that presume individuals construct 
their own identities in isolation, but unfortunately the sociological literature has focused 
too narrowly on situations where people compete over identities related to status as 
defined by particular macro-demographic characteristics.  This literature is based 
primarily on the trickle down theory of fashion (Rae, 1834; Foley, 1893; Veblen, 1899 
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[1912]; Simmel, 1904 [1957]; Barber, 1957; Robinson, 1961), which suggests people 
adopt from those above them in the status food chain.  Fashions are initiated by the 
higher class and imitated by the lower classes, but once the lower classes have adopted, 
the signal value is lost, and consequently high class people abandon the taste.  In the 
context of social groups in the United States, this literature has essentially endeavored to 
explain why Northeastern WASPs seek to distance themselves from every other group in 
the country (e.g., blue collar workers, Southerners, Catholics, ethnic minorities).    
As Mark (2003) notes, the original emphasis of the distinction literature is overly 
asymmetric, focusing too much on high status people distancing themselves from low 
status others.  Many examples of abandoning tastes are not easy to classify in terms of a 
unidimensional status ordering; teenagers reject catchphrases once they creep into their 
parent’s lexicon and just as London and Morgan (1994) found that whites selected names 
to distance themselves from blacks, blacks often abandon clothing styles or slang that are 
adopted by whites.  Fashion does not solely originate among the upper classes, and in fact 
often comes from low-status or somewhat marginalized groups.  Much of fashion has 
been started  
“not so much by the upper or even middle classes, as by the déclassé, anti-class 
youth, and counterculture. Long hair, head bands, beads, tie-dyed apparel...not 
only mock the materialistic status symbols of the established classes, but have 
successfully spread into the enemy camp, Fifth avenue and Main Street, where 
they have caught on and been copied,” (Blumberg, 1971, p. 493).  
While some theoretical approaches have touched on the notion of bidirectional influence 
(e.g. mass market or trickle across theories--Sproles, 1981, 1985; King, 1963) and 
subcultural leadership (e.g. Blumberg, 1974; Field, 1970), they have not systematically 
discussed how the process works, and in particular they have not recognized that 
adoption by non-countercultural types will lead the counterculture to abandon tastes. 
Our signaling identity perspective takes a more general approach to divergence; 
rather than divergence driven by status, we suggest divergence is driven by the desire to 
maintain clear signals of identity.   
 
Experimental Evidence on Abandonment  
Some experimental evidence has examined taste abandonment while controlling 
for macrodemographic status.  Berger and Heath (2005) studied college students and 
examined whether adoption by other college students would lead them to abandon tastes.  
In the first stage of the experiment, Stanford students in a mass testing session provided 
their preferences in a number of taste domains.  In the car brand domain, for instance, 
participants were presented with brand names/logos for five car brands (Acura, BMW, 
Mercedes-Benz, Volvo, Lexus) and asked to circle which car they preferred.  Two to 
three weeks later, participants returned to the lab in small groups for a study in which 
they had a group discussion about their preferences.  After an initial exercise, the 
experimenter apologized, saying he had run out of copies for the second portion and had 
to go make them.  During the first part of the experiment a research assistant had been 
working at a side table in the experiment room, visibly entering data form a previous 
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study.  While the experimenter was gone, participants were asked to help this assistant 
tabulate some preference data.  Each participant was given a stack of surveys that had 
been carefully tailored to suggest that others shared the preferences they had expressed in 
the mass testing session in some domains (e.g., 8 out of 10 of the data sheets they tallied 
choose the same car brand that they chose previously).  When the experimenter returned 
with the copies, participants completed a questionnaire that asked for preferences in a 
variety of preference domains (some the same as the completed at time 1).  They then 
met together as a group as discussed which options they had selected. 
Supporting the abandonment hypothesis, participants who were confronted with 
similar responses by 6-8 fellow students were likely to abandon the tastes they had 
expressed in the earlier questionnaire.  Furthermore, supporting the domain hypothesis, 
they were more likely to abandon tastes in domains that were afunctional and more 
identity relevant.  A mean split on identity inferences found that participants diverged 
28% of the time in domains used to infer identity (e.g. music preference) but only 17% of 
the time in domains not as likely to be used to infer identity (e.g. bike lights).  The results 
hold controlling for a number of alternative explanations.  There was no difference in 
popularity of participants’ original preferences (percentage of participants choosing a 
given option) between the two sets of domains and we also controlled for number of 
others selecting one’s preference across the sets (e.g. 8/10 others chose the same car and 
8/10 others chose the same bike light), so one cannot attribute the results to differences in 
prior popularity or perceived similarity.  A follow up study established that the difference 
in preference between the first and second choices was no different between identity and 
non-identity domains, so the greater abandonment for identity domains did not occur 
because the second domain was more attractive.  Finally, because both the participants 
and supposed adopters were students, one cannot explain the results in terms of status-
based divergence.  
This study was built on the assumption that when people learn that their 
preferences are shared with others, they should perceive that that preference is not an 
effective signal of identity.  In another study, we tried to create a situation in which 
people could actually see that a certain signal no longer had value in distinguishing 
between types.  In this study, we examined the abandonment of an actual cultural 
product.  In the summer of 2004, the Lance Armstrong Foundation started selling yellow 
Livestrong wristbands to support cancer awareness and research.  Originally, the 
wristbands were worn primarily by athletes, but later caught on and spread contagiously 
in the general public (see Walker, 2004 for an in depth description).   
During the upswing of this trend, we distributed these wristbands to various 
dorms on a university campus to examine how signal dilution might affect abandonment.  
Specifically, we sold 40 wristbands to one dorm of 60 people (high prevalence 
condition), and half that many were distributed to each of two other same size dorms on 
separate parts of campus (low prevalence conditions).   (All proceeds went to the Lance 
Armstrong foundation.)  A week later, researchers returned to the dorms and through an 
unrelated questionnaire measured whether dorm members were wearing the wristband 
they had purchased.  We predict people in the high prevalence dorm should be less likely 
to wear the wristband because its meaning has become more diluted--with more 
wristbands around it was more likely that everyone from computer scientists to hardcore 
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partiers to athletes were wearing them and thus they had less value in distinguishing 
between these types.  Indeed, abandonment was greater in the high prevalence dorm, 
where a smaller percentage of members actually wore the wristband to house meeting 
(58% vs. 88% in control dorms).   
These experimental results are difficult for the uniqueness literature to explain.  A 
greater number of others sharing one’s car preference or possessing the wristband might 
have made people feel slightly less unique, but the differences used here (e.g. 30 vs. 15 
others having a wristband) were nowhere near the extreme similarity manipulations used 
in the traditional uniqueness experiments (e.g. 80% similarity to 10,000 students on 30 
attitude items).  
 
Abandonment Based on Who is Adopting 
We can also use the framework of model three to think about signaling in a richer 
multiple type setting.  Overall, adoption by other types should lead to divergence, but we 
predict that divergence may be greater when the adopting type is more dissimilar.4  We 
could capture this effect even in a model with only two types, if we assume that the two 
types differ more or less.  Presumably, larger type differences imply that people 
experience higher costs when they are misidentified as members of the wrong type. That 
is, the differences between correct and incorrect identification 
 
bA(A, α) - bA(A, β)  and bA(B, α) - bA(B, β) 
 
become larger when the types are more dissimilar.  Snowboarders might not want to be 
identified as skiers, but they might prefer that mistake over being misidentified as a 
golfer.   
Alternatively, we could imagine an enriched model that includes many types that 
vary in similarity to the base Type A (e.g. F is further away than B).  If tastes diffuse 
across similar types, then when a particular taste has been adopted by a very dissimilar 
type, it is likely that it has been adopted by more people (e.g. if Y has adopted it is likely 
that B, C…F have also adopted), and thus that the signal has experienced a higher degree 
of dilution.  Consequently, one would expect that divergence would increase with 
dissimilarity. 
To test this notion, Stanford undergraduates were told to imagine their groups of 
friends engaged in a certain behavior that been adopted by some other group (Berger & 
Heath, 2005).  For each of 15 social groups (e.g. 40 year old white business executives, 
janitors, college professors, suburban teenagers, etc.) they were then asked to rate how 
many other people outside that group were likely engaging in the behavior given that 
                                                 
4 We use similarity in a broader sense than mere demographic similarity.  A hip teenager may be 
demographically dissimilar to a 50-year-old business executive, but if the executive has a shaved head, 
wears black, and makes independent movies, then the two may be considered similar on the dimension of 
hipness even though they differ demographically. 
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group had adopted.  Another set of raters rated the groups on similarity.  Supporting our 
prediction, number estimates were highly negatively correlated with similarity (r = -.74); 
people assumed more people had adopted the taste if the adopting group was dissimilar.  
It is worth noting that there exists a countervailing effect that should lead to 
relatively increased divergence when adopting types are extremely similar. The previous 
two points were based on the consequences of misidentification, but the probability of 
misidentification should also vary.  When types are more similar, they are more likely to 
overlap in their tastes and they may be more likely to be confused with each other.  Also, 
similar types should be more likely to encounter each other than to encounter more 
distant types. Thus, the higher frequency of interaction with similar others implies a 
greater benefit for signaling. 
Combining these factors, we predict a curvilinear relationship between similarity 
of the adopting Type And divergence; people will be more likely to abandon a practice 
when it is adopted by dissimilar types, but they may also abandon the practice when it is 
adopted by a type that is extremely similar.    
Similarity Hypothesis: the influence of similarity of the adopting type on 
divergence will be curvilinear; both extreme dissimilarity and extreme similarity 
will lead to increased divergence. 
We tested this hypothesis (as well as the impact of adopter status) in a study 
regarding catchphrase usage (Berger & Heath, 2005).  Stanford undergraduates were told 
to imagine their group of friends liked to say a particular catchphrase that no one else was 
saying.  Then they were asked to rate how their use of the phrase would change if it were 
adopted by various other social groups. Other sets of students rated each group on 
similarity, liking, and demographic status.   
In general, for 14 out of the 15 groups, people said they would be more likely to 
abandon the catchphrase when others adopted it (see Figure 2 for the pattern), the lone 
exception was Stanford athletes.  The effect was most pronounced for highly dissimilar 
groups but was also noticeable for similar groups.  The curvilinear effect for similarity 
held even when we controlled for liking and demographic status. 
These results are consistent with the signaling approach but inconsistent with 
other theories.  Theories of conformity obviously predict convergence when other people 
adopt a taste, not divergence.  Conformity and other theories (see e.g., Bryson’s 1996 
sociological approach) might predict that divergence is caused when people dislike other 
groups, but the similarity result holds even when liking is controlled.  This should make 
intuitive sense-- kids may like their parents a lot, but diverge when parents adopt their 
slang or way of dress.  Sociological models of status also have difficulty explaining these 
results. Status of the adopting group was not significantly correlated with divergence and 
while sociological models of status would only predict divergence when lower status 
groups adopt, we found adoption by almost every other type led to decreased taste usage. 
The current results are most surprising from the standpoint of the uniqueness 
literature.   This literature suggests that abandonment is driven solely by similar others.  
Our results show that similar others matter, but if anything dissimilar others matter more.   
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An additional study tested both the domain and similarity hypotheses, examining 
how characteristics of the adopting Type And the particular taste domain would influence 
divergence.  Stanford students were given 10 domains varying in how much they were 
used to infer identity, told to imagine members of a given group had started to copy their 
preference in that domain (e.g. Princeton students had started adopting their favorite type 
of music), and asked to provide the percentage of members of a given group adopting 
their taste that would lead them to abandon their taste.  We varied the group who adopted 
the practice in a between subjects design; we chose three groups that rated equivalently 
on liking (40 year old business executives; inner city teens, and Princeton students) that 
had previously been rated as low moderate or highly similar to our Stanford participants.    
Supporting our predictions about signaling, people were more likely to diverge in 
domains used to infer identity (e.g., clothing versus bike lights), and there was a 
curvilinear relationship between amount of divergence and the similarity of the adopting 
group--participants diverged more when the adopting group was either extremely 
dissimilar (i.e. 40 year old business executives) or extremely similar (i.e. Princeton 
students) than when it was in the middle (inner city teens), see Figure 3.  There was also 
an interaction between similarity and the degree to which the domain was used to infer 
identity; both similar and dissimilar groups prompted divergence in domains used to infer 
identity, but similarity had no effect in domains where tastes are not used to infer identity 
(e.g. toothpaste).  This interaction provides particularly clear support for signaling--
people care about the clarity of their signals, but only in domains where signals are being 
sent.  
 
Summary: Who drives divergence and why? 
Our signaling identity approach answers the question of who drives divergence 
and why.  People diverge when other types adopt their practices and they become less 
able to signal their identity.  This relationship is curvilinear--people diverge from similar 
others because the likelihood of misidentification is high, and they diverge more from 
very dissimilar others because the cost of misidentification is high. 
A major advantage of our model is the capacity to explain why divergence occurs 
even when the adopting group is dissimilar.  Previous literature has emphasized 
similarity-- the uniqueness literature argues divergence is driven by similar others and 
some social identity research has argued groups feel increased pressure to differentiate 
themselves from similar outgroups (Brown & Abrams, 1986; Diehl, 1988; Jetten, Spears, 
& Manstead, 1997; Roccas & Schwartz, 1993).  Previous research has not explained, 
however, why groups might want to differentiate themselves from dissimilar others.  This 
seems to neglect some key phenomena in the environment: punks or inner city teens 
would probably abandon tastes that were adopted by suburban teens (or, even more 
serious, suburban parents), people in LA are likely to abandon tastes that are adopted by 
people in Des Moines.  Our signaling approach suggests the reason: people in Des 
Moines may be quite dissimilar from those in LA, but the fact that they have adopted will 
undermine the signaling value of the taste, and lead people in LA to diverge. 
Although we have argued that pressures to divergence are more general than 
suggested by the sociological and economic literature that has focused on macro-
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demographic status, that literature has correctly recognized that some social groups may 
find the problems of poaching to be particularly acute.  If people like to appear wealthy, 
the rich must keep switching signals; as soon as the riff-raff can acquire counterfeit Prada 
bags, the rich must change signals to stay ahead of the game.  But our model goes beyond 
the traditional sociological emphasis on macro-status because it predicts the divergence 
race will also be more intense for types that are highly imitated because they are 
interesting or cool--say, gay men or inner-city kids.  When these types find their 
distinctive signals have been knocked off, clouded, or confused (e.g., the imitation of gay 
men by straight “metrosexuals”) then they will be forced to change signals in order to 
maintain signal clarity. 
Our research also provides some experimental backing to the notion that 
popularity may lead tastes to die because they no longer distinguish between types 
(Lieberson, 2000; Simmel, [1904] 1957).  While distinctive tastes allow types “to define 
themselves and recognize members and outsiders” (DiMaggio, 1987, p. 448), when 
something becomes popular it reduces the information value of the taste.  Massification 
may consequently lead to abandonment: “smiley-face t-shirts were cast off as uncool and 
the word ‘acid’ was dropped from club names and music genre classifications as soon as 
‘acid house’ became a term familiar to general readers of national newspapers,” (Thorton, 
1997, p 6.).  This presents an interesting macro-level paradox.  While people are drawn 
people to popular things because others like them, if too many people hold the same taste 
it loses both its value as a unique attribute and as a signal and those who care about the 
signal will abandon it.   
We might also speculate that people pay attention, not only to how many others 
are adopting something, but to how rapidly they are adopting it.  Classic “fads” have a 
steep second derivative--quick rise and quick fall.  Perhaps people are quicker to abandon 
things that have a quick rise because they realize the signal value of these things is 
depreciating rapidly.  Some things may maintain their status as cult objects for a long 
period of time (Rocky Horror, Grateful Dead) because there is a relatively constant 
equilibrium of entries and exits into the practice. 
 
Costly Signals 
As discussed previously, signals are often costly, yet the prediction of Model 1 
was that signals would be visible and low cost.  The idea of poaching introduced in this 
model provides insight into why costly signals may persist.  While people might prefer to 
signal with the least possible cost, cheap signals are the most likely ones to be poached.  
Thus costly tastes should be more likely to persist over time because they impose barriers 
that make adoption relatively difficult.  Tastes that are painful (e.g. piercing), require lots 
of money (e.g. expensive jewelry), or take a long time to acquire (e.g. obscure music) 
make it more difficult for people to adopt and thereby resist signal dilution.  In many 
situations this process may occur by unplanned social evolution (e.g. certain tastes 
happen to be more costly, and thus are more likely to persist) but in other cases types may 
deliberately select costly tastes to foil poachers: the jazz musicians who developed the 
New York sound “deliberately sought to restrict white identification by producing a jazz 
which was difficult to listen to and even more difficult to imitate” (Hebdige, 1987, p. 47).  
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We saw in model 2 that tastes are more effective signals when different types of 
individuals face dramatically different costs.  We identify four different categories of 
costs:   
 
1. Functionality costs. Signaling domains should not be functional. If the domain is 
highly functional—e.g. a properly worn hat—then the cost imposed is very small 
for all types—and thus not very effective in distinguishing between them. 
2. Effort costs. Signaling domains that require a high initial cost of effort are 
especially effective. Specialized music knowledge or ritual scarring are highly 
costly for all types to obtain. However, they are effective signals because in future 
periods, maintenance costs are low, whereas the cost for others remains high. 
3. Opportunity costs. Signaling domains must be sufficiently visible so that they 
impede the ability of posers, Type BAs, to interact with others.  Wearing a 
mohawk may make it difficult to buy a house or get a job.  
4. Communication costs. Certain tastes can only be acquired as people interact 
extensively with others engaged in the same activity. Learning the hottest 
independent bands, or arcane sports trivia, is easier for people in the in-group 
because they are surrounded by conversations about these topics.  If slang 
develops amongst members of Type A, learning it is cheap for Type A but 
expensive for Type BA (due to homophily, members of Type A are more likely to 
have connections to slang speakers).  However, there will always be a few Type 
BA members with Type A friends and they will be the first to adopt.  As the 
numbers of BA who adopt the slang spread, it also becomes easier for other BA’s 
to adopt. Before long, the signal becomes diluted and is abandoned.  
 
Visibility 
These last two costs add a new tension along the dimension of signal visibility.  Publicly 
visible signals are both easier to see and easier to copy.  Signals must be visible to be 
received, but more visible signals are easier to poach.  If Harley Davidson riders wear 
black leather jackets, it will be easier to associate jacket-wearing with Harley-riding than 
with some other, more private, signal (e.g., a tattoo that is hidden under clothing most of 
the time).  But this visibility also makes it easier for posers to recognize the signal and 
copy it.  Visible signals should lose meaning faster and consequently, we should see 
faster turnover in taste domains that are more public.   
Visibility also interacts with opportunity costs.  Some highly visibility signals 
may be less likely to be copied because they impede interactions with other types.  Types 
may select high visibility, high opportunity cost signals if they strongly dislike interacting 
with other types (e.g. punkers who disdain the mainstream). Conversely, some types may 
select a low visibility signal to allow for easy interactions with other types but still 
identify each other.  The subtle signals of homosexual men provide a good example:  
Rubinstein (1995) notes that before the 1980s, most gay men felt pressure to remain 
invisible to mainstream culture and consequently had to come up with subtle signals that 
could be identified by other gay men, but not by outsiders.  To do so, they adopted what 
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has been termed the Old Clone look, wearing “jeans, lumber shirts, jackets, and heavy 
boots and sporting a mustache and sunglasses…instantly recognizable by other gay men, 
the look would not offend at work, for most non-gay colleagues would miss its 
significance” (p. 215).  By selecting subtle signals, they were able to signal only to 
members of the same type. 
Signaling identity is stable so long as there is no conflict of interests.  In the first 
two models, all the actors were happy with the way others wanted to treat them. In the 
model of poaching, however, BA’s want to be treated as if they were A’s. This conflict 
between types makes signaling more difficult, forcing types to use different, more costly, 
signals. As the costs associated with signaling domains change over time, we observe the 
dynamics we associate with many kinds of fads and fashions. 
 
General Discussion 
We have proposed a signaling identity approach to divergence: people diverge to 
maintain clear signals of identity.  Importantly, this process is socially driven.  Instead of 
focusing on idiosyncratic individual drives, we focus on communication and the 
reception of meaning.  Meaning is determined by social interaction: tastes acquire 
meaning when they are expressed by similar types of people and they lose meaning when 
they are adopted by other types.   
Our approach answers a number of questions that have been unanswered by 
previous approaches to divergence.  Divergence does not occur idiosyncratically by 
individuals, rather types of individuals diverge when signals of identity have been 
undermined.  Divergence should be more prevalent in domains used to infer identity and 
these domains are likely to be ones in which choice is not based on function.  Divergence 
is not driven by similar others, but occurs whenever adoption by other social types reduce 
a taste’s signaling value.   
Our approach is also broader than one focused on novelty, status or liking.  Rather 
than focusing on individual boredom, high status individuals diverging from people of 
lower status, or people diverging from those they dislike, we suggest divergence will 
occur whenever signal value has been undermined. 
Although the game theoretic model we use invokes the language of choice, we do 
not believe that divergence is necessarily conscious or intentional.  Social influence can 
often occur nonconsciously (Pronin, Berger, & Molouki, 2005), and research on mere 
exposure (Kuntz-Wilson & Zajonc, 1980) and social mimicry (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999) 
suggests people may come to like things others like and imitate the behavior of others, all 
without awareness that they have been influenced by others.  People may choose different 
tastes from other social types and abandon tastes when other types adopt not because they 
consciously want to diverge from those individuals, but because those tastes just don’t 
seem “right” for them.  Game theoretic models are useful in understanding animal 
behavior even though animals do not consciously choose their actions because an 
evolutionary process tends to favor certain kinds of behavior.  Similarly, we assume that 
the evolution of cultural practices will tend to favor certain signals because they are better 
at enabling effective social coordination.   
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Divergence and Culture 
Our approach also adds to discussions regarding cultural differences in self-
expression.  Cultural psychologists suggest that relative to Americans, members of East 
Asian cultures prefer less uniqueness (Kim & Markus, 1999; Kim & Drolet, 2003; Aaker 
& Schmitt, 2001), and thus uniqueness based explanations have trouble explaining why 
we still see much divergence in East Asian cultures (just as the U.S has skaters, surfers, 
punks, etc. Japan has kawaii-baby doll, yamamba-mountain witch, bodikon-skimpy skirts 
and high-heeled boots, Mead, 2002).  A signaling approach, however, does not have such 
difficulty.  Even though the self is less focal, members of East Asian cultures should 
diverge for the same reason Americans do, to signal clear identities as members of types 
or collectives.  Indeed, if collectives are more important in East Asian cultures, then 
identity signaling dynamics may be even more important (Wong & Ahuvia, 1998). 
The Dynamic Meaning System  
The fact that meaning changes socially suggests that even if a given individual 
has a desired identity they want to express, the actual tastes that individual holds will 
vary over time as their meanings change.  A rich white male may have originally worn 
Tommy Hilfiger to signal his upscale preppy identity, but the adoption of Hilfiger 
clothing by hip-hop artists in the early 1990’s meant that continuing to wear those clothes 
signaled an entirely different identity. 
While our discussion has focused on the active divergence when signals lose their 
value, the notion of signaling suggests convergence and divergence happen even in the 
absence of these drives.  Thus people may end up conforming not because they want to 
imitate others, but because they do not want to send out the wrong signals.  When 
hairstyles were trending longer in the 1960s, the typical person may have been forced to 
track the expanding length because they did not want to send a strong signal on either 
end--too short and they are considered stodgy and conservative, too long and they are 
considered to be hippies.  The social nature of signaling means that even when 
individuals don’t want to send a particular signal, they may need to alter their behavior to 
stay in step with the social dynamic.  
Cycles of Fads and Fashions 
Seeing tastes as signals of identity also helps understand why fads and fashions 
fluctuate.  Rather than being restricted to certain taste types (e.g. Beanie Babies and Hula 
Hoops), labeling something as a “fad” or “fashion” refers to the taste’s lifecycle (e.g. 
rapid fluctuations in popularity) rather than its underlying nature (Aguirre, Quarantelli, & 
Mendoza, 1988; Blumer, 1969; Fearon, 1998; Robinson, 1958).  Similar processes of 
rapid adoption and abandonment occur in everything from management practices (e.g. 
Total Quality Management) to public policies (e.g. whole math) to academic literature 
(e.g., consider Strauss and Quinn’s 1997, p. 12, comments about how theories rise and 
fall in anthropology).  While lay theories of fads and fashion suggest people abandon 
practices because they just “get tired of them” (some disciplinary theories suggest the 
same, see Sproles, 1981) a signaling perspective provides more insight.  Whenever tastes 
signal identity, and especially when they are visible and thus easy for posers to poach, we 
should see wild upswings in popularity followed by broad scale abandonment as taste 
holders diverge because the taste’s signaling value has been diluted. 
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Figure 1: Divergence in Taste Selection by Taste Domain 
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 Figure 2: Change in Taste Expression Based on Similarity of the Adopting Group  
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Figure 3: Divergence Threshold Based on Similarity of Adopters and How Much the 
Taste Domain is Used to Infer Identity 
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Mathematical Appendix Material 
 
There have been a number of important economic theory papers on the subject of fads 
and fashion. Banerjee (1992) started an important line of research into conformity based 
on private information. Bernheim (1994) argues that the desire for status is a driver of 
conformity. By adding a monopolistic fashion industry that takes advantage of this 
impulse, Pesendorfer (1995) suggest some fads would decline as firms try to maximize 
profits. Becker and Murphy (2000) argue that leaders abandon old fashions in order to 
maintain distinction. 
 
The contribution of this model is that the driver behind fads and fashion is not status, but 
identity, where identity is important for mediating social interaction. Furthermore, the 
driver of change is not from changes in the production technology, i.e. the fashion 
industry, but based on changes in behavior within the population. The richness of the 
model allows us to identify other properties of fashion, beyond just price, that allow us to 
predict what products and activities are likely to become fashion statements and thus 
suffer the ups and downs of fad-like behavior. 
 
Presented below are the technical details of the models presented in the paper. Let there 
be a large community of actors, of different types, start with, A, B with population 
proportion fixed at pA, pB . Presume individuals with a sufficiently low discount rate to 
avoid folk theorem effects. In each stage, actors have preferences over interactions and 
over signals. Presume separability, so that in each sub-stage, an agent of type, x, who 
chooses signal i ∈ Z, and has history of signal choice h, and interacts with another agent 
of type y with interaction  z, receives stage utility of 
 
Ux = bx(y, z) – c(i, x, h) 
 
where b(-) represents the benefits of the interaction and c(-) represents the costs 
associated with choosing that particular signal. 
 
In the interaction stage, one party is randomly selected as sender, and the other as 
receiver. For simplicity, we focus on the sender’s utility; the receiver’s utility is 
essentially symmetric. We take the cost function to be given exogenously. We presume 
the cost of any given signal is the same for all members of the same type except for an 
individual specific normally distributed zero-mean error term. Also, each possible signal 
choice, i, has associated visibility, v(i), the probability it will be properly observed. 
 
Each period of the game proceeds as follows.  In the first stage, all actors simultaneously 
choose a signal. In the second stage they are randomly paired with uniform probability 
(for simplicity). With equal probability, one is randomly assigned to be the signal sender, 
the other is the receiver. The receiver observes the sender’s signal chosen in the first 
stage with probability v(i), and then the receiver chooses how to interact. Assume for 
simplicity that if no signal is observed, then no interaction takes place. 
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Let there be two types of interactions, {α, β}. The receiver always prefers to choose α if 
the sender is of Type A and always prefers to choose β if the sender is of Type B. That is: 
 
bA(A, α) > bA(A, β) and  bA(B, α) > bA(B, β) 
 
bB(A, β) > bB(A, α) and bB(B, β) > bB(B, α) 
 
Similarly, for the preferences of the sender, assume that Types A and B are happy with 
how other types want to treat them.  
 
bA(A, α) > bA(A, β) and  bA(B, α) > bA(B, β) 
 
bB(A, β) > bB(A, α) and bB(B, β) > bB(B, α) 
 
Here, however, for simplicity, assume that all types get utility σ > 0 when they are 
treated as they wish to be treated, and utility 0 when they are not. That is, let 
 
bA(A, α) = bA(B, α) = bB(A, β) = bB(B, β) = σ 
bA(A, β) = bA(B, β)= bB(A, α) = bB(B, α) = 0 
 
One final simplifying assumption. For the purpose of this analysis, assume costs are 
history independent. 
 
Solving the Model 
 
We focus on pure strategy sequential Nash equilibria. By the myopia assumption, we can 
focus on just one period. We solve by backward induction, that is we describe what 
happens in the second stage of the game where individuals interact, and then, we use that 
to solve for what happens in the first stage, the choice of signal. In the second stage, 
receivers observe the signal, and update their beliefs regarding the sender’s type. Based 
on the beliefs the receiver chooses the appropriate interaction. Beliefs are based on the 
signals actors choose in equilibrium in the first stage. Specifically, suppose some signal k 
is observed by the receiver. Let r be the proportion of actors of Type A who chose signal 
k. Let s be the proportion of actors of other types that chose signal k. 
 
Then the receiver’s belief that the sender is of Type A is equal to the actual probability 
the sender is that Type And is given by: 
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We could also call this expression, m(k), the meaning of signal k. In a world with many 
people, r and s are ratios set by large populations. The change of signaling behavior by 
any one person has little impact on the meaning of a signal. Furthermore, if we make the 
reasonable assumption that r and s are not observed perfectly, but inferred from 
haphazard observations from past periods, then attempts to signal alone—choosing a 
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signal where m(k)=0—will be punished because individuals who send out novel signals 
will fail in their interactions. Note also, that if Type A’s are the only type that choose this 
signal, that is, s=0, then the meaning of the signal m is 1. In other words, the receiver is 
sure of the sender’s identity.  
 
The first stage is essentially a coordination game, so nearly any set of signals can be part 
of a coordination game equilibrium. For our purposes, we are interested in the signals that 
would be picked if types were unitary actors. In this simple example, we have perfect 
alignment of preferences. If each type chooses a different signal, then there will be 
perfect identification whenever the signal is observed. Thus we would expect Type A to 
choose a signal i and Type B to choose a different signal j. 
 
Utility for each individual is given by the benefits of interaction minus the cost of 
signaling. The benefits of interaction are equal to the probability of visibility times the 
expected payoff from interaction, where the expected payoff is the probability of correct 
identification times the benefit of a correct interaction plus probability of incorrect 
identification times the benefit of incorrect interaction (assumed to be zero). 
 
UA = v(i)[ m(i) σ + (1-m(i)) 0] - c(i,A) 
UB = v(j)[ m(j) σ + (1-m(i)) 0]  - c(j,B) 
 
However, since in this simple case, each signal identifies the other individual with 
probability 1, and the receiver will always treat the sender as she wants this simplifies to 
 
UA = v(i) σ- c(i,A) and UB = v(j) σ - c(j,B) 
 
 
Thus, the optimization problem is given by 
 
maxi ∈ Z  UA = v(i) σ - c(i, A)  and maxj ∈ Z  UB = v(j) σ - c(j, B) 
 
We maximize by differentiating the actor’s utility functions with respect to visibility, vi, 
and cost, ci. 
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Since the derivative with respect to visibility is positive, actors would choose signals with 
the highest possible visibility. Since the derivative with respect to costs are negative, 
actors would choose signals that minimized costs.5 
                                                 
5 Side note that is not discussed in the paper: Since there is often a trade off between high visibility and low 
costs, in point of fact, actors would choose a signal where these partial derivatives were equalized. If we 
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Choice of Domains 
The above intuition can be applied toward the choice of domains. Potentially, we could 
have a model where visibility is determined endogenously, and actors had to choose 
which signals to look for. When there are more domains to signal in, each domain has 
lower visibility.  Then signaling will only occur in certain domains, and there will have to 
be coordination so actors look for signals in the same domains other actors choose to 
signal in.   
 
Formally, let us pre-pend another stage before the stages in the game above.  Before 
signals are selected, actors select a domain in which to signal.  
 
Define domain to be a set containing each of the possible signaling behaviors actors can 
choose to engage in. For example, the power saw domain contains the set of possible 
power saws on the market. The coat domain contains the set of coats one might wear. 
Each coat has a bundle of attributes each providing a different set of costs and benefits. 
The baseball cap wearing domain contains the set of possible ways to wear a cap, such as 
backwards or sideways 
 
Assume for simplicity, that if more than one domain is selected, visibility goes to zero. 
Actors simultaneously choose a domain in which to signal, effectively determining the 
choice set of signals that are available to them in the signal selection stage. Formally, let 
D denote the set of possible domains, then the maximization problem becomes: 
 
maxZa ∈ D maxi ∈ Za  UA = v(i)[ m(i) σ ] - c(i,A) 
maxZb ∈ D maxj ∈ Zb  UB = v(j)[ m(j) σ ]  - c(j,B) 
 
In equilibrium, actors will choose the same domain, Zb = Za = Z, by our assumption that 
miscoordination on domain leads v(-) to go to zero. We see from the utility function that 
if signaling loses visibility, then actors are incurring costs but with no benefits. The 
maximization problem is over the same function, thus low cost and high visibility is still 
preferred.  However, here the choice set is over domains. Thus, instead of choosing a 
signal with one associated cost, the groups are choosing sets of cost. The socially optimal 
choice maximizes some social welfare function, for instance, the simple sum of utilities 
 
Welfare = UA + UB = b(-,A) – c(i,A) + b(-,B) – c(j,B) 
 
We saw from the first model that groups A and B should optimally choose different 
signals, i ≠ j,  in order to effectively differentiate. Ignoring visibility for the moment, 
without loss of generality, let i be the signal that minimizes c(i,A) and normalize c(i,A) = 
                                                                                                                                                 
assumed the various signals i were ordered continuously, then we would expect the marginal rates of 
substitution to be equalized: 
ci
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c(i,B) = 0. Then, if i also minimizes costs for group B, then signal j can only be second 
best. 
 
i = argmini∈ Z  c(i,A) 
j = argminj∈ Z, j≠ i c(j,B) 
 
Since a welfare maximizer cares about the sum of c(i,A) and c(j,B), the second best is 
crucial. Thus the domains that are best suited for signaling are domains where the 
difference between the first best and second best are minimized. 
 
There are two properties of domains that help minimize this difference. The first is to 
choose domains where the difference in tangible costs/benefits associated with any 
particular style are minimal. In domains were differences are primarily based on color or 
style, cost differences are minimized.  
 
The second is to choose domains where costs are unlikely to be perceived in the same 
way by different groups. In functional domains, for example, the tangible costs and 
benefits will likely be the same for different groups such that 
 
c(s,A) = c(s,B) for all s ∈ Z 
 
In these domains, the first best for both groups will be the same, and one will be forced to 
accept second best. In domains where groups differ in how costs are experienced, the 
problem of the second best is avoided. 
 
In the domain of power saws, where different saws are mostly differentiated by 
functional attributes such as power or speed and people are more likely to agree on which 
saw is optimal: not choosing the optimal saw for a given task is potentially quite costly. 
However, in the domain of coats, different coats are largely differentiated on attributes 
such as color or style and people are less likely to agree on which is optimal: differences 
in costs and benefits across coats are quite minimal and likely outweighed by differences 
across people. Thus, the requirement that different groups choose different signals is only 
minimally costly. 
 
As the number of types that wish to identify themselves increase, the problem becomes 
more pronounced. It is quite plausible that in the domain of cars, for any given individual, 
there are five different brands or models that are fairly similar in terms of the costs and 
benefits they provide. If we want to partition the world into more than five groups, we 
would require groups to start choosing models beyond that first five, models that actors 
would start to find highly unsatisfactory. Signaling motives would have to be strong 
enough to make it worthwhile for actors to choose models with reputation, price, fuel 
economy, etc., that differ markedly from first best. How actors deal with the allocation of 
scarce signals when there are more groups than signals is considered later in the 
appendix. 
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Though considering the functionality characteristics and cost minimization properties of 
domains explains a wide variety of domain choice, there are some domains where 
signaling is quite costly—e.g. body piercings, or arcane knowledge—domains whose cost 
functions defy these predictions. Some other mechanisms must be at work. Our proposed 
candidate is signal poaching. 
 
Signal Poaching 
 
Now, to consider the phenomenon of signal poaching, let us return to considering 
domains as being exogenously fixed, but now, add a third type, Type BA. BAs are 
actually B’s and thus other types prefer treating them like B’s, i.e. they would prefer to 
choose action β.  However, type BA’s would prefer treatment α. 
 
bBA(A, β) > bBA(A, α) and bBA(B, β) > bBA(B, α) 
 
Or again, we simplify and say 
 
bBA(A, β) = bBA(B, β) = σ and bBA(A, α)= bBA(B, α) = 0 
 
By introducing the BA types, things get more complicated. Type BA would like to 
choose signal i rather than signal j in the choice of signal stage, but would only do so if 
the benefits received from the interaction stage outweigh the costs. 
 
Let π be the fraction of posers that adopt signal i. The fraction π is based on the random 
noise of the cost function. More precisely, π is the fraction of the poser population, where 
the net benefits of posing, v(i) m(i) σ – c(i, BA), are greater than the net benefits of not 
posing, – c(j, BA). 
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Recall that pA is the fraction of the population of Type A. Note that all actors of Type A 
will choose signal i. In that case, the probability that an actor showing i actually is of 
Type A would be given as 
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Recall that receivers of Type A will treat the sender as a member of Type A so long as 
the benefits of choosing α outweigh the benefits of choosing β: 
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Rearranging we get  
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Rearranging again, and defining the right hand side of the above equation as ρ, we can 
say that the signal will remain meaningful so long as 
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Note that ρ gets larger as the penalty from making a mistake increases. Then we can say 
that a given signal retains meaning so long as π is below some critical threshold that is 
decreasing in the penalty for a mistake, ρ, and increasing in the proportion of other A 
types in the population . We can now write sender of Type A’s optimization problem as 
 
maxi ∈ Z v(i) [pA/(pA+π)]σ - c(i, A) 
 
We can differentiate with respect to π  to get 
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This term is negative, so Type A wants to keep π as low as possible. One way to do this 
is by choosing a signal i that makes c(i, BA) as high as possible. 
 
However, as before, Type A would still also want to choose a signal i that minimizes 
costs c(i, A). 
 
Combining these two results, we see that in the presence of poaching, the actor is no 
longer just minimizing costs, but instead, maximizing the difference in costs c(i, BA) – 
c(i, A), incurred by the posers versus the real thing. 
 
When signals are scarce 
 
As in the paper, if we want to consider situations where there are many groups, and only 
a few signals available, actors have to budget their use of signals. It is reasonable to 
assume that actors would allocate those signals to applications with the highest payoffs. 
 
To extend the model, let us fix one group A, but consider group A’s possible interactions 
with other groups g, where g could be group B, but could also be group C, group D, etc. 
each with their own posers, of Type BA, CA and DA, etc. respectively. Define fg to be 
the frequency of interaction with any given group. 
 
Now, we can write total utility as 
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Thus, if there were a limited number of signals available, the benefits to signaling would 
be highest when either frequency of interaction fg was highest, such as the case when 
dealing with similar others, or when the consequences of failed identification are highest,  
 
bA(g,~α) << 0. 
 
Alternatively, there could be some exogenous probability of automatic recognition that 
varies by group dyads. College students from different schools would have a low chance 
of automatic recognition. Whereas teenagers compared to executives would have a high 
chance of automatic recognition. In cases where automatic recognition is low, the 
benefits to signaling are high. 
 
A note on visibility 
 
There are two other tensions introduced by visibility that this model implies that are 
beyond the scope of this appendix. Though even with poaching, this model predicts that 
agents always want high visibility, if we think about the dynamics of costs over time, 
Type A’s may want to choose low visibility signals, if this impedes the ability of posers 
to copy. 
 
Notice as well, that visibility interacts with how posers are treated by Type B’s. If Type 
B’s treat Type A’s poorly, with disdain, in other words 
 
bBA(B, α) < 0 
 
Then a high visibility signal is good for raising the opportunity costs of posers when they 
copy. High visibility effectively reduces π, by reducing the benefits received from using 
Type A’s signal. 
 
It is important to appreciate that at any given time, there could be many of the 
interactions described here going on in parallel. It is possible for a poser to attempt to 
choose two signals in different domains, one that is more visible to A types, and one that 
is more visible to B types. A high visibility signal such as a mohawk, makes it difficult 
for posers to have it both ways. 
 
 
 
 
